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Abstract  
Universities’ use of formal intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents and registered 
copyright has increased steadily in the last two decades. Mainstream arguments advocating 
the application of IPR protection to academic research results, embedded in economic theory 
and policy, are based on the view that IPR marketplaces work well and allow universities to 
reap significant benefits.   
However, evidence-based research to justify or critically evaluate these claims is lacking. 
Building upon an original survey of 46 universities and public research organizations in the 
United Kingdom, this study analyzes the quality of the institutions underpinning the markets 
for patents and copyright, investigating potential inefficiencies that could lead to 
underperformance of the IPR system. These include: (i) IPR market failures with respect to: 
search processes and transparency; price negotiation processes; uncertainties in the perception 
of the economic value of IP and the relationship with R&D cost; and (ii) institutional failures 
with respect to enforcement and regulation. Particular attention is paid to the role of the 
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governance forms (e.g. alternative types of licensing agreements) through which IPR 
exchanges take place.  
We find that a high share of universities report market failures in IPR transactions and that the 
choice of IPR governance forms matter for the market obstacles that are encountered. Given 
the importance of widely disseminating university research outcomes to foster innovation and 
economic development, the presence of inefficiencies in IPR markets suggests that such 
objectives could be best achieved by encouraging open distribution of knowledge, rather than 
privatization of academic knowledge as a best practice.  
 
JEL: D02, D23, O31, O32, O34 
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copyright, universities, public research organizations (PRO).   
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1. Introduction 
Starting from the 1980s, policymakers have increasingly supported the view that 
protecting the results of academic research through intellectual property rights (IPR) 
is necessary for university-produced knowledge to be transferred effectively (see, for 
example, OECD, 2003). It was argued that the possibility to commercialize their own 
IP and to derive income from this activity would induce universities to be more 
proactive in disseminating their knowledge to the economic system, and would in turn 
allow industry to better exploit scientific discoveries (Eisenberg, 1996; Mowery and 
Sampat, 2005). Consequently, in many countries legislative measures have been 
passed aimed at strengthening university ownership of intellectual property (IP) with 
a view to encourage them to seek IPR protection and engage in IPR 
commercialization (see Geuna and Rossi, 2011, for an overview of legislative changes 
in Europe). 
Although there is a growing literature on the nature and effects of university patenting 
activities, little attention has so far been paid to exploring how universities exchange 
IPR with other organizations - that is, how they engage in IPR markets - and the 
extent to which the institutional features of such markets allow universities to reach 
their strategic objectives. Understanding these issues however is important as an 
appraisal of the effectiveness of the legislation and policy measures that encourage 
universities to trade knowledge protected by IPR. It is also important in order to 
contribute to the ongoing debate as to whether academic knowledge is best 
disseminated through the traditional open science channels or through the use of IPR 
markets, since the arguments in favour of the latter are often dependent on the 
assumption that such markets function efficiently. 
The present study makes an original contribution to these debates. Building upon 
UKNOW data
1
 collected from the technology transfer offices of 46 universities and 
public research organizations in the United Kingdom (about 27.5% of the considered 
population), we perform an exploratory analysis of how efficiently and effectively 
these institutions use markets for IPR. In other work (Andersen and Rossi, 2010, 
2011a, 2011b) we discussed how universities exchange various types of IP, 
                                                 
1
 The UKNOW database was developed as part of Work Package 3.2: "An IPR Regime in Support of a 
Knowledge Based Economy" of the UKNOW (Understanding the Relationship between Knowledge 
and Competitiveness in the Enlarged EU’) (2005-2009) project of the EU 6th Framework Programme. 
 4 
proprietary and non-proprietary
2
, in order to pursue different types of strategic 
benefits, and we suggested that non-proprietary forms of IP (such as open source and 
the exchange of non-patented innovations) are preferred in order to acquire external 
knowledge for innovation purposes and in order to transfer knowledge to external 
agents, while proprietary forms of IP (such as patents and copyright) are considered 
preferable when the objective is purely to gain income. We also found that non-
proprietary forms of IP are exchanged at least as frequently as proprietary ones. In 
this study, we focus on proprietary IP embedded in patents or registered copyright. In 
particular, we explore the functioning of the markets where patents and copyright are 
traded, by investigating, from the universities’ perspective, whether these markets 
suffer from inefficiencies. 
The potential sources of inefficiencies that we analyze include: (i) IPR market failures 
with respect to: search processes and transparency; price negotiation processes; 
uncertainties in the perception of the economic value of IP and the relationship with 
R&D cost; and (ii) institutional failures with respect to enforcement and regulation. 
The analysis pays particular attention to the role of the governance forms through 
which IPR exchanges take place (e.g. alternative types of transaction agreements such 
as buying and selling, licensing, cross-licensing, pooling). Our findings allow us to 
explore ways in which the functioning of these markets could be improved, and to 
further contribute to the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of protecting 
academic research outcomes through IPR.  
The article is structured as follows. In section 2, we review some of the existing 
literature on academic patenting and on the institutional features of IPR markets, 
which influence their efficiency and their effectiveness in allowing universities to 
reach their strategic objectives via IPR exchanges. We also discuss our approach to 
understanding IPR markets as institutions, in which our interest is in investigating the 
extent to which these markets suffer from “IPR market” and “institutional” failures, 
from the perspective of universities that engage in them. In section 3, we introduce 
the data underpinning the research. In section 4 we present and discuss the results of 
the empirical analysis, and in section 5 we draw some conclusions. 
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 In the following analysis, we use the term “proprietary IP” (or, equally, intellectual property rights, 
IPR) to identify IP upon which restrictions on use, sharing, copying and modification are enforced by 
legal means, and “non-proprietary IP” for IP on which some or all of these restrictions are relaxed.  
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2. Universities and IPR marketplaces: evidence and research gaps 
2.1. Universities’ involvement in IPR marketplaces 
Universities’ involvement in patenting has increased steadily in the last twenty years. 
At least since the 1980s, policymakers have supported the view that intellectual 
property rights are required for university-produced knowledge to be transferred 
effectively (see e.g. references in Eisenberg, 1996). It was argued that the possibility 
to commercialize their own IPR and to derive income from these activities would 
induce universities to be more proactive in disseminating their knowledge to the 
economic system (Eisenberg, 1996; Mowery and Sampat, 2005), and would allow 
them to derive extra income for their research activities (Kenney, 1986), which is 
especially important in a period of shrinking public budgets for higher education 
(Geuna and Muscio, 2009).  
These and other arguments (reviewed extensively for example by Mowery et al, 2001) 
have underpinned the introduction of legislation directed at expanding and 
strengthening the application of IPRs to the outcomes of publicly-funded research, of 
which the Bayh-Dole Act implemented in the United States in 1980 is an early and 
very influential example. The Act gave US universities control of their inventions and 
other IP resulting from federally-funded research, and encouraged the use of formal 
IP protection in the form of patents. This was believed to be the best mechanism for, 
among other things, “providing an economic incentive for companies to pursue 
further development and commercialization of government sponsored R&D through 
corporate ventures between and among the research community, small businesses and 
industry” (Schacht, 2005). 
Legislation aimed at similar objectives and including similar provisions has later been 
adopted in many other countries around the world (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). In many 
European countries, universities have moved away from the “professors’ privilege” 
model of IPR assignment – according to which IPR on the outcomes of scientific 
research conducted at universities would be assigned to the professor-inventor, who 
would then be free to either apply for a patent directly or to let another beneficiary, 
usually, a firm, apply on his or her behalf – in favour of university ownership of IPR. 
Regulations that assign to universities the ownership of intellectual property arising 
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from government-funded research and the right to commercialize the results obtained 
have been implemented (with varying degrees of stringency) in Flanders (1998), 
Denmark (2000), Germany (2002), Austria (2002), Norway (2002) and Finland 
(2007). Italy is the only country that has bucked the trend, awarding ownership rights 
to faculty employees (Mowery and Sampat, 2005). In the UK, Cambridge maintained 
a model of assignment of IPRs based on the professors’ privilege until very recently, 
and there is evidence that this mode of governance for IPR was successful, leading to 
intense technology exploitation on the part of local firms and supporting lively 
academic spinout activity (Breznitz, 2008, ref. in Kenney and Patton, 2009). 
Nonetheless, also Cambridge moved to a “university-owned” model of IPR 
governance in 2005. 
As a consequence of the introduction of legislation assigning universities the right to 
patent publicly-funded research, and especially thanks to the establishment in most 
institutions of technology transfer offices that often pursue aggressive patenting 
policies, there have been increases in the number of university-owned patents (Geuna 
and Nesta 2006; Geuna and Rossi, 2010) and in universities’ licensing revenues 
(AUTM, 2002, for the US; Geuna and Rossi, 2010, for Europe) indicating increased 
engagement of universities in transactions involving patents.  
This is in line with a broader trend, which involves many sectors other than 
universities, consisting in the generalized increased use of markets for IPRs, often 
referred to in the literature as “markets for technology” (Arora et al, 2001; Athreye 
and Cantwell, 2005; Cockburn, 2007). The strategic use of IPR markets has become 
key to firms’ economic success and sustainable corporate competitiveness (Thurow, 
1997; Chesbrough, 2003). 
 
2.2. Market failures and institutional failures in IPR markets 
The phenomenon of increased university patent ownership has attracted criticisms 
from academics, giving rise to an extensive literature on the negative effects of 
university patenting (recent comprehensive reviews of the debate can be found in 
Baldini, 2008, Nelson, 2004). Studies have investigated likely impacts of university 
patenting on the direction and quality of scientific research (as universities may 
eschew more risky, long term basic research in favour of more commercially 
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promising short term applied research projects), on the dissemination of research 
results (as universities may restrict the open circulation of scientific knowledge in the 
form of publications and research tools, limiting the further advancement of 
knowledge), on the quality and intensity of collaborations with industry (as 
universities may compete directly with firms for access to markets and litigate with 
them over the assignment of IPR, leading to a deterioration of their relationships), and 
ultimately even on the rate of innovation of the economy. 
Despite the lively debate about the implications of university patenting, little attention 
has been paid to the problems that universities encounter when engaging in IPR 
markets. This is, nonetheless, a very important issue because most arguments 
advocating increased patenting of academic research results, and increased university 
ownership of such patents, are based on the assumption that the patent market works 
well and allows universities to reap significant benefits from engaging in it. 
There are however many indications that this is not always the case. Evidence 
suggests that universities are often unsuccessful in reaping rewards from the 
privatization of academic knowledge.  
First, it has been shown that income from technology transfer is very skewed, with 
very few universities making money from patents and licences (Charles and Conway, 
2001; Bulut and Moschini, 2006): for many universities, the direct costs of IPR 
exceed revenues (Charles and Conway, 2001) and technology transfer offices struggle 
to be profitable (Kenney, 1986). It must be noted that, as universities gain experience 
with patenting and become more selective with their patent applications, the 
profitability of patent exploitation activity is increasing (see recent data for the UK 
presented by HEFCE/PACEC, 2010). Still, for most universities in the UK, 
collaborative research projects, including consultancies, are a more important source 
of income than licensing (D’Este and Perkmann, 2007).  
Second, much patent effort in many universities does not realize value. For example, 
Tang et al (2009) discuss the problem of abandonment of university patents, finding 
evidence that 25-30% of patent applications are abandoned prior to the filing stage 
due to problems such as low quality of the patent, difficulty in finding a potential 
investor and/or the fact that the underlying technology is unsuitable for patenting. 
Tang et al (2009) suggest that this rate of abandonment does not indicate a failure of 
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the patent system as much as “further awareness of the disutility of “patenting 
everything that can be patented”3. 
Several explanations have been proposed for the asserted inability of universities to 
exploit their IPRs to their full potential.  
According to Macdonald (2009) one of the key problems that may explain the lack of 
success of many universities in exploiting the patent system for economic reward is 
that such system does not work well in all economic activities. The model of 
knowledge production and transfer based on intensive patenting works well in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Levin, 1986; Harabi, 1995) but it is not prevalent in most 
other industries, such as software and electronics, where most firms rely on trade 
secrets, marketing strategy and lead times to exploit technological advantage, rather 
than on patents (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). By adopting a model of technology 
transfer that is based on the experience of the pharmaceutical industry, university 
managers tend to overstate the importance of patents (Rappert et al, 1999). The fact 
that the importance of patents differs by industry (Klevorick et al., 1987) suggests that 
universities need different knowledge transfer procedures, methods and goals for 
differing industries. It must also be remembered that the sheer variety of university 
research activities implies that universities produce a wide range of intellectual 
property not all of which is suitable to be patented (Baghurst and Pollard, 2009)
4
.  
Even in cases where university patents may hold value for industry, another problem 
is that university managers are often naïve users of the patent system, unaware that 
reaping its benefits requires using the system strategically (for example by engaging 
in defensive patenting or in amassing patent portfolios to cover specific areas of 
technology), or lacking the resources to do so (Macdonald, 2009). More generally, 
                                                 
3
 The problem of under-exploitation of IPR is common to commercial firms as well. Rivette and Klein 
(2000) identified “a staggering $1 trillion in [ignored] intellectual property asset wealth” in the US, 
while the PATVAL Survey of European inventors found that while 11% of a random sample of EPO 
patents had been licensed, an additional 7% could be licensed, but were not, and a study by consulting 
firm BTG International found that 35% of patented technologies (valued at $115 billion) were ignored 
by the firms that developed them. Cockburn (2007), in a survey of US firms, finds that on average 
more than 1/3 of firms’ total inventory of IP is rated as being unlikely to be licensed even though the 
firm would be willing to transact if it could. 
4
 Examples are non-software copyrighted materials (articles, reports, books, lecture notes, 
presentations); software (source level code as well as executable programmes developed by researchers 
in the course of their research work); materials (synthesised by researchers working in the fields of 
chemistry and materials); database rights; cell lines; new plant or animal varieties; registered and 
unregistered designs; photographs and videos; research questionnaires; and finally, tacit knowledge 
(know-how), which is hard to codify and transfer but which is nonetheless valuable to third parties. 
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Rivette and Klein (2000) point to managerial myopia, inertia, and incompetence as 
explanations for under-exploitation of IP. 
Besides the factors mentioned so far, another reason for universities failing to make 
the most of the IPR system may be related to the fact that markets for technology face 
many institutional obstacles and structural challenges. That is, even when patenting of 
university research outcomes is feasible, it may still be the case that universities fail to 
profit from their IPR exchanges due to problems and inefficiencies in the 
marketplace.  
Mainstream economics argues that knowledge privatization is necessary in order to 
remedy the market failure connected to the inherently public nature of knowledge 
(what has been termed the “tragedy of commons”; Hardin, 1968), and assumes that 
the instantiation of property rights automatically gives rise to markets where they can 
be traded (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). For a well-functioning market to emerge, 
there must be no uncertainty on the quality, characteristics and value of the product 
that is exchanged (i.e. the good must be akin to a “commodity”); consequently, the 
transacting parties are able to agree on a market price that regulates the exchange 
efficiently. Therefore, if well-functioning IPR markets are to emerge spontaneously 
(Arora et al, 2001) it must hold that anyone reading the IPR document should be able 
to fully understand and value its contents and to implement the knowledge codified 
therein (Gans and Stern, 2003). If this is the case, the only requirement for 
transactions to be sustainable is, like for all market-based contracts (Williamson, 
1975), the presence of adequate enforcement mechanisms to prevent free riders who 
have not purchased or licensed the IPR from exploiting the knowledge they embed, 
and the presence of safeguards to punish attempts to deviate from the contract terms. 
In the reality of actual IPR exchanges, however, further complications arise. First, 
there may be considerable uncertainty around the characteristics of the intellectual 
asset that is exchanged. Second, as emphasized by institutional economics (Hodgson, 
1988, 1999) processes of exchange are supported by networks of social relationships 
and by many and complex institutions. The institutions which support and influence 
exchange processes can be both physical infrastructures and entities (in the case of 
IPR, examples are patent databases, intellectual property offices, copyright and 
trademark libraries) as well as, very importantly, institutions in a sociological sense 
(social norms and rules of behaviour, whether explicitly codified into laws, 
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regulations and codes of practice, or informally held among a community of agents 
participating in the marketplace; different norms give rise to different types of 
markets, such as auction markets, price tag markets, medieval type regional street 
markets, black or unauthorized markets, and so on). Moreover, the social relationships 
through which exchanges take place are underpinned by individual beliefs and 
expectations (in relation to the other party’s trustworthiness, the fairness of the 
contract and its price, and other aspects) which may influence the outcome and 
characteristics of the transactions (Bromiley and Harris, 2006). To emphasize the web 
of social relationships and supporting institutions that are required for processes of 
exchange to take place, as well as the physical and metaphorical interaction space 
where they unfold, in the following discussion we prefer to use the concept of 
“marketplaces” rather than the notion of “markets” used by mainstream economics.  
Problems in the marketplace can be of different types. If markets are considered as 
price clearing mechanisms, they often “fail” when the characteristics of the good are 
not perfectly known by both buyer and seller (problems of asymmetric information; 
Akerlof, 1970), or when one or both parties are not fully able to capture the benefits 
of the exchange (problems of spillovers and externalities; Arrow, 1969). If 
marketplaces are considered as platforms of social relationships whose functioning is 
supported by historically evolving institutions, it is possible to identify at least in 
principle a different kind of failure, which can happen even when the “goods” traded 
therein fulfill all the standard assumptions: the failure of supporting institutions to 
ensure the efficient functioning of these marketplaces. 
Both of these sets of problems (which, for simplicity, we call respectively “market” 
and “institutional failures”) can occur when IPR is exchanged, at least in principle. 
Moreover, different governance forms for the exchange of IPR can be affected by 
these problems in different ways. Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) bring attention to 
the fact that specific governance forms for IPR exchange are associated with different 
processes of value seeking: for example, a patent cross licensing agreement may be 
due to the expectation to achieve strategic market positioning, whereas selling a 
patent may be due to gaining one-off income, and a patent pool may be due to the 
development of a common technological standard. Similarly, the processes of selling, 
buying, out-licensing or in-licensing patents may be affected by market and 
institutional failures in different ways. 
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The objective of the empirical investigation presented in this article is to shed some 
light on the problems that universities encounter when engaging in the marketplaces 
for patents and copyright, paying attention to the specificities of the governance forms 
through which IPR exchanges take place. 
The analysis is developed in three parts. 
IPR market failures: we investigate whether some key assumptions underpinning the 
emergence of well-functioning marketplaces are reflected in the universities’ 
experience. First, we ask whether it is possible to claim that the parties in the 
exchange possess perfect and symmetric information about the good that is 
exchanged, and whether the markets clears rapidly thanks to the identification of 
potential partners in the transaction and the emergence of a market-clearing price (that 
is, we explore whether knowledge embedded into IPR becomes “commodified”. 
Second, we investigate whether the process of price setting reflects the assumptions 
underpinning IPR theory: that is, the argument that the (temporary) monopoly power 
guaranteed by IPR confers full appropriability over the invention, so that the inventor 
is able to extract a monopoly price that covers the R&D cost of the invention and 
reflects its economic value (Arrow, 1962). Out conceptual framing of IPR market 
failures, which has informed our data collection, is outlined in Table 2 (Part 1) and 
Table 3. 
Institutional failures: we investigate institutional failures in the marketplace by 
analyzing whether the enforcement mechanisms in the marketplace function properly; 
whether it is possible to rule out opportunistic behavior (either by means of effective 
contractual safeguards, i.e. by negotiating “complete” contracts, or thanks to the 
presence of trust among the parties); whether there are shared social and behavioural 
norms that facilitate transactions by promoting shared expectations; and finally 
whether formal IPR regulations are adequately supporting IPR exchanges. Out 
conceptual framing of institutional failures, which has informed our data collection, is 
outlined in Table 2 (Part 2). 
Role of IP governance: We also investigate the extent to which the various failures 
are specific to certain IP governance forms within the patent and copyright 
marketplaces. These include alternative licensing forms, as well as buying and selling 
of patents and copyright, and they are outlined in Table 1.  
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The analysis of the problems that universities encounter when exchanging IPR in the 
marketplace provides interesting suggestions for policymakers who may wish to 
remove, as much as possible, any obstacles to the efficient exchange of IPR, and 
allows us to contribute new empirical evidence towards an emerging literature on 
problems in markets for technology (Arora et al, 2001).  
 
3. Data source and variables 
The empirical analysis is based upon survey data on a sample of universities, colleges 
and public research organizations based in England, Scotland, Wales or Northern 
Ireland, collected between October 2008 and March 2009
5,
 The UKNOW database 
was developed at Birkbeck College (under the coordination of Birgitte Andersen) 
under Work Package 3.2: "An IPR Regime in Support of a Knowledge Based 
Economy", as part of the UKNOW (Understanding the Relationship between 
Knowledge and Competitiveness in the Enlarging EU’) project of the EU 6th 
Framework Programme (contract number CIT 028519). 
The list of relevant institutions and of their respective technology transfer offices was 
drawn from the website of the University Companies Association (UNICO), which 
represents the technology exploitation companies of UK universities. The list of 120 
members of UNICO was downloaded in October 2008. The details provided by 
UNICO are: each member organization’s name and website, as well as name, email 
and telephone number of their contact person. This list was then integrated with the 
set of institutions that responded to the HEBCI 2004-05 and 2005-06 surveys 
(HEFCE, 2007), which includes 162 universities, colleges and public research 
organizations. Since no addresses or contact names were included in this list, such 
information was retrieved from each institution’s website. 
The two lists were merged and, after correcting different spellings and eliminating 
double entries, a final population of 169 different organizations was assembled. A 
mass mailing was sent out in mid November 2008, followed by three rounds of 
personal emails sent out between December 15th 2008 and February 28th 2009. In 
order to reach the target response rate, questionnaires were posted out at the 
                                                 
5
 Throughout the article, we refer to this sample as “UK universities”, for sake of simplicity and also 
because university colleges and public research organizations comprise less than 25% of the sample 
and of respondents, as evidenced in Table 4 presented later. 
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beginning of March. Respondents had a choice of different options through which 
they could answer the survey: filling in the questionnaire available online; returning 
an electronic copy of the questionnaire by email; returning a copy of the questionnaire 
by post or fax. We obtained 46 valid responses (27.2% response rate).  
Taking into consideration several types of IP protection mechanisms (patents, 
copyright, open source and non-patented technology), and several governance forms 
for the exchange of such IP (selling, buying, out-licensing, in-licensing, cross-
licensing, pooling, and so on) universities were asked questions concerning : 
 the extent and intensity with which they participated in each marketplace and 
each governance structure (stock of IP held and number of transactions in the 
previous two years); 
 the strategic benefits that universities seek when trading IP; 
 the obstacles that universities encounter when trading IP; 
 the way in which IP price is determined and its efficiency (these questions 
were only asked in relation to patents and copyright). 
Finally, universities were requested to provide some general information: geographic 
localization, ownership (independent or subsidiary), size (current number of 
employees, current yearly turnover), research intensity (yearly expenditure in R&D), 
geographic extension of the organization’s main market (domestic or international), 
and sector of activity. A few additional variables relating to organizational 
characteristics were derived from other sources
6
. (An overview of the respondents can 
be found in section 4.1.) 
The present analysis builds upon the respondents’ answers in relation to their 
experience with the exchange of patents and copyright, considering the governance 
forms listed in Table 1.  
Table 1. IP marketplaces and governance forms considered in the analysis 
IP marketplaces Governance forms 
                                                 
6
 The number of academic staff and total staff (academic, non-academic, atypical) of the institution 
(relative to 2007/08), the share of academic staff employed in scientific fields (engineering and 
technology, medicine and natural sciences, in the same period), and the income of the institution were 
drawn from HESA’s (the Higher Education Statistics Agency) database. The year of foundation of the 
technology transfer office and the number of staff employed within were drawn from the HE-BCI 
survey (relative to 2007). 
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Patents as a tool for the 
protection of novel ideas 
Selling patents 
Out-licensing patents 
Cross licensing patents 
Participation in patent pools 
Buying patents 
In-licensing patents 
Copyright as a tool for the 
protection of original creative 
expressions 
Selling copyright 
Out-licensing copyright 
Buying copyright 
In licensing copyright 
 
The questions used to perform the analysis presented in this article are those relating 
to : (i) participation in IPR marketplaces ; (ii) obstacles found in IPR marketplaces ; 
and (iii) price setting mechanisms and their efficiency. The following table lists the 
possible obstacles that universities were presented with (grouped according to 
whether they indicate failures in the assumptions of IPR theory – which we term “IPR 
market” failures – or failures in the institutions that support the marketplace – which 
we term “institutional” failures). For each marketplace and governance form, 
universities were asked to tick the five most important obstacles that they 
experienced.  
Table 2. “IPR market” and “institutional” failures considered in the analysis 
Type of 
“failure” 
Assumption tested Specific obstacle investigated 
Part 1: 
IPR market 
failures 
Perfect information about 
characteristics and value of IPR 
Difficulty in finding the best IPR 
Difficulty in assessing degree of 
novelty/originality of the IPR 
Lack of clarity of IPR document  
Difficulty in assessing economic value of IPR 
Market “clears” easily 
Difficulty in locating owners of IPR 
Difficulty in locating users of IPR 
Difficulty in negotiating a price for IPR 
Part 2: 
Institutional 
failures 
Presence of enforcement 
mechanisms 
Excessive cost of enforcing contract 
Problems, not related to cost, with enforcing 
contract 
Possibility to rule out opportunistic 
behaviour by negotiating 
“complete” contracts or thanks to 
trust 
Difficulty in negotiating the terms, not related 
to price, of contract 
Trust issues (opportunistic behaviour, free-
riding, or similar) 
Shared behavioural norms and 
expectations 
Different practices of firms 
Presence of adequate supporting 
regulations  
Regulations allow too exclusive rights 
International IPR regulations do not fit needs 
of different local markets 
 
Universities were also presented with several statements about the price setting 
process and the efficiency of the IPR price (indicative of possible market failures), 
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with respect to which they were asked to express their agreement or disagreement. 
Table 3. Further “IPR market” failures considered in the analysis 
Type of 
“failure” 
Assumption tested Choice options 
Part 1 
(cont.): IPR 
market 
failures 
IPR confer (temporary) monopoly 
power 
Price is usually set by the buyer 
Price is usually set by the seller  
Price is usually jointly negotiated between 
buyer and seller 
Price is usually set by third (independent) party 
Depends on circumstances: no usual way in 
which price is set 
IPR render knowledge perfectly 
appropriable and make it possible 
to cover R&D costs 
Price of IPR usually correctly reflects 
economic value of invention 
Price of IPR is usually able to cover research 
and development (R&D) costs of invention 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Context : respondents and their participation in IPR marketplaces 
The sample includes organizations that belong to several main “types”. Most are 
universities, some are university colleges and other institutions of higher education 
(such as music conservatoires and arts colleges), and a few are public research 
organizations. Table 4 compares the distribution of institutions in the sample and in 
the set of respondents, across several main characteristics: geographical localization, 
size (in terms of academic staff employed), institutional type, both with respect to 
status and to historical origin (distinguishing between universities, other higher 
education institutions and public research organizations, and further subdividing 
universities into 5 categories according to the period in which they were founded
7
). 
The distribution of respondents by geographic localization, institutional type and size 
in terms of total staff is representative of the overall sample. 
Table 4. Structure of sample and respondents 
 
sample (169) respondents (46) 
% % 
geographic 
localization 
England 82.2 89.1 
Wales 5.3 4.3 
Scotland 11.2 6.5 
Northern Ireland 1.2 0.0 
                                                 
7
 The categories are the following: “old” universities (founded before the mid-XIX century); “red 
brick” universities (founded between the mid-XIX century and the mid-XX century); “plate glass” 
universities (founded between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s); “former polytechnics” (institutions 
formerly designated “polytechnics” which changed their status to universities in 1992); “modern” 
universities (founded after 1992, not formerly designated “polytechnics”).  
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Total 100 100 
type 
“old” universities 5.9 8.7 
“red brick” universities 17.8 26.1 
“plate-glass” universities 13.6 15.2 
“former polytechnics" 20.7 19.6 
“modern” universities 16.6 8.7 
colleges of higher education 16.6 8.7 
public research organizations 7.7 13.0 
Other 1.2 0.0 
Total 100 100 
size (total 
staff) 
<500 10.7 4.3 
500-1000 13.0 10.9 
1000-5000 47.3 56.5 
>5000 24.3 28.3 
Missing 4.7 0.0 
Total 100 100 
 
Of the 46 respondents, 13 do not exchange any form of IP, while 29 exchange patents 
and 15 exchange formally registered copyright. Of the 29 organizations that engage in 
the patent marketplace, most (28) engage in out-licensing patents, and more than half 
(17) are active in selling patents, while comparatively few engage in in-licensing (5) 
buying (4) cross-licensing (5) or participating in patent pools (4). Of the 15 
organizations that exchange formally registered copyright, most are active in selling 
copyright (12) and in out-licensing it (9), while fewer are active in buying (6) and in-
licensing (3) copyright. Thus, selling and out-licensing are the most frequently used 
governance forms for the exchange of both patents and copyright. This is confirmed 
by the data on IP transactions: the total stock of in-licensed patents is a small fraction 
(about 7%) of the total stock of owned patents, suggesting that universities tend to file 
their own patents rather than in-license them from other organizations. On average, in 
the previous two years, each university out-licensed 11 patents, sold 3.6 patents and 
engaged in 3.3 patent pooling agreements. No universities reported engaging in the 
purchase of patents in the previous two years, while each university engaged on 
average in 1.4 in-licensing transactions and 1.2 cross-licensing agreements. These 
results are in line with the conventional view of universities as original research 
performers, active in developing IP and transferring it to other organizations rather 
than in acquiring IPRs from the outside. 
Moreover, the overall number of patents sold, out-licensed, cross-licensed and pooled 
in the previous two years constitutes only 11.4% of the university’s overall stock of 
own patents (excluding those that have been in-licensed) confirming that most of the 
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universities’ patents are not commercialized. 
Table 5 details the shares of different types of organizations that engage in the 
exchange of patents and/or copyright.  
Table 5. Participation in IP marketplaces by type of organization 
  patents copyright 
N % % 
type “old” universities 4 75.0 75.0 
“red brick” universities 12 50.0 16.7 
“plate-glass” universities 7 57.1 42.9 
“former polytechnics" 9 88.9 44.4 
“modern” universities 4 25.0 0.0 
colleges of higher education 4 25.0 25.0 
public research organizations 6 100.0 83.3 
size  
(total 
staff) 
less than 500 2 50.0 50.0 
500-1000 4 50.0 25.0 
1000-5000 24 62.5 37.5 
more than 5000 16 68.8 43.8 
 
Public research organizations, old universities founded before the XIX century and 
former polytechnics that have become universities in 1992, are the institutions that 
engage the most in exchanging patents. Conversely, colleges of higher education and 
“modern” universities founded after 1992 engage the least in patent exchange. Public 
research institutions and old universities are most active in the exchange of registered 
copyright, while colleges of higher education, “red brick” and “modern” universities 
exchange copyright the least. Greater size of the institution in terms of total staff is 
associated with greater engagement in patent exchange. This is consistent with other 
evidence which suggests that most patenting activity is done by larger, research-
oriented universities (“old” universities in the UK tend to be more research-oriented, 
and so are public research organization) (Charles and Conway, 2001; UNICO, 2003); 
at the same time, the intense engagement in patenting on the part of former 
polytechnics is consistent with some evidence suggesting that also less research 
intensive universities, which are less successful in obtaining research grants, can be 
strongly engaged in patenting, since in order to raise funds from industry they turn to 
performing more applied research, leading to more patentable results (Thursby and 
Kemp, 2002). 
 
4.2. IPR market failures 
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We first investigate whether the assumptions of mainstream economic theory about 
the characteristics and functioning of IPR markets are reflected in the universities’ 
experience, and whether the exchange leads to efficient outcomes. We ask whether 
the assumptions about the “commodity” nature of IPR are satisfied (in particular, 
whether it is possible to claim that the parties in the exchange possess perfect and 
symmetric information about the good that is exchanged, and whether the market 
clears rapidly by allowing the rapid identification of a partner for the transaction and 
the emergence of a price), and whether the IPR system is successful in conferring a 
temporary monopoly power which allows the inventor to set an “efficient” price that 
correctly reflects the economic value of the invention and that is able to cover the 
R&D cost of the invention. 
Several questions in our survey allows us to assess whether universities have perfect 
information about the IPR that they exchange. Table 6 reports the shares of 
universities that consider the obstacles reported in the left column as important. 
Shares are computed with respect to the number of universities that answered each 
question.  
Table 6. Information failures 
Assumption 
tested 
Specific obstacle investigated Patents Copyright 
 Number of universities that answered question 14 11 
Perfect 
information 
about 
characteristics 
& value of IPR 
Difficulty in finding the best IPR 28.6% n.a. 
Difficulty in assessing degree of 
novelty/originality of IPR 
64.3% 27.3% 
Lack of clarity of IPR document 0.0% n.a. 
Difficulty in assessing economic value of IPR 92.9% 72.7% 
 
The universities’ answers show that the content of the IPR is generally clear and it is 
not too difficult for universities to identify the best patents to exchange
8
. This 
indicates that the patent system in successful in codifying the knowledge embedded in 
the patent documents, so that it can be clearly understood and transmitted
9
.  
                                                 
8
 This is consistent with results discussed by Cockburn (2007) when studying patent licensing deals in 
the US and Canada: here, only about 10% of survey respondents cited uncertainty about the strength or 
scope of IP rights, and less than 5% cited other “structural” issues such as there being too many parties 
involved in the negotiation. What really matters is the ability to reach agreement on financial terms and 
non-financial terms of the licensing contract; again, consistently with results found in our survey.  
9
 Universities were not asked to agree with the statements “Difficulty in finding the best IPR” and 
“Lack of clarity of the IPR document” with reference to copyright as these obstacles were not 
considered relevant to the case of copyright. 
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However, it is quite difficult to assess the originality of patents, especially when 
selling and out-licensing them (this problem is less important in the case of copyright, 
where the requirements for creative expressions to be original are much less stringent 
than in the case of patents). A possible explanation for this is that, as knowledge is 
increasingly patented, it becomes increasingly common to patent inventions with 
smaller inventive steps and it becomes more difficult for patent examiners to certify 
the effective novelty of the invention with respect to the “state of the art”, sometimes 
leading to “bad patents” (Moore, 2006). Hence, universities may find it hard to 
persuade potential buyers and licensees of the novelty of the knowledge embedded in 
their patents. By far, the most serious problems for universities is the difficulty in 
assessing the economic value of the IPR (particularly when out-licensing and selling 
it). This may be linked to the fact that academic knowledge is often quite basic in 
nature, and therefore it is characterized by high uncertainty in terms of the type and 
amount of potential implementations that it may give rise to, as well as in terms of the 
time it will take for those to emerge (Nelson, 1959). It may therefore be difficult to 
persuade potential buyers or licensees of the value of this knowledge, in order to 
obtain a “fair” price. Moreover, the patent’s value usually depends on its intended 
utilization (Merges and Nelson, 1990) which makes it difficult to reach an objective 
valuation. Another reason may be lack of information (Monk, 2009): in order to arrive 
at an accurate valuation, the potential buyer would need to know the details of all the 
licenses granted on a patent, but existing licenses are frequently subject to 
confidentiality agreements. Consequently, the potential buyer may be unable to value 
the patent correctly, because it would not know if its main competitors already have 
licenses or not.  
The difficulty in identifying potential partners for IPR transactions and in negotiating 
prices are discussed in table 7, which reports the shares of universities that consider 
the obstacles reported in the left column as important. Shares are computed with 
respect to the number of universities that answered each question. In the case of 
patents, almost 60% of universities that answered this question find it difficult to 
identify potential users of their patents. This may be linked to the nature of academic 
patents, which are often at an early stage of development and costly to commercialize, 
and hence few firms are willing to invest in them (i.e. “no end-user demand” problem; 
Jensen and Thursby, 2001); but it may also indicate prohibitively high “search costs”, 
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due to the time and expense associated with identifying and researching niche markets 
and communicating the features and benefits of the technology (Cockburn, 2007), 
despite the existence of tools like searchable patentable databases. According to 
Monk (2009) the desire on the part of buyers to maintain anonymity also limits the 
market. Often, interested buyers prefer to remain anonymous in order not to disclose 
to industry competitors information about what technology and product lines they are 
pursuing. Because of this, the seller may not know the identity of the potential buyer 
and the reasons why they are interested in the patent or license, and this may make it 
more difficult to negotiate the transaction. 
Table 7. Market clearing failures 
Assumption 
tested 
Specific obstacle investigated Patents Copyright 
 Number of universities that answered question 14 11 
Market 
“clears” 
easily 
Difficulty in locating owners of IPR 14.3% 18.2% 
Difficulty in locating users of IPR 57.1% 9.1% 
Difficulty in negotiating price for IPR 57.1% 63.6% 
 
These search-related problems do not appear to be of great relevance in the copyright 
marketplace, where buyers and sellers are found quite easily.  
In the case of both patents and copyright, negotiating a price proves difficult. This is 
probably due to the above-mentioned problem of assessing the economic value of the 
IPR, which gives rise to contrasting valuations of the good (Mansfield et. al., 1981; 
Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
Because it is often difficult to identify potential buyers or sellers and, when these are 
found, it is difficult to negotiate the price, the market does not “clear” easily. 
Cockburn (2007) finds similar results when studying patent licensing deals in the US 
and Canada: in about 1/3 of cases, the would-be transactor was unable to identify 
even a single potential licensor or licensee to approach (in the case of our set of 
universities, this problem appears to be even more serious as close to 2/3 of 
respondents find it difficult to identify potential users); where firms were able to 
identify a potential licensor/licensee, in only about 1/3 of cases, substantive 
negotiations over a licensing deal were entered into, and of these negotiations about 
50% failed to reach an executed agreement.  
As most negotiations prove to be difficult, it is interesting to investigate in more detail 
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what is the process through which a price eventually emerges. Tables 8 and 9 report 
the shares of universities that agree with the statements reported in the column on the 
left; shares are computed with respect to the number of universities that answered 
each question, and averaged across governance forms. When buying or in-licensing 
patents, universities perceive themselves as being the weaker party in the exchange, 
with the seller being able to set the price. That is, they buy or in-license patents for 
which there may be many potential buyers and hence the seller is in a stronger 
bargaining position. When universities sell, out-license, cross license or pool patents, 
the situation is akin to a bilateral monopoly, with a seller/licensor and a 
buyer/licensee negotiating to obtain a favourable price. This is probably due to 
academic patents being either very basic and far from potential implementation and/or 
embedding very specialized and advanced knowledge, so that not many firms are 
looking to acquire them, which leads the potential buyer to be in a stronger bargaining 
position. 
Given that universities - when selling, out-licensing, cross-licensing or pooling 
patents - are not able to exploit their monopoly over patented knowledge in order to 
extract a high price but rather bargain the price with the other party, it is not 
surprising to find that few universities agree that the price negotiated correctly reflects 
the value of the invention and covers the cost of the R&D that produced it. That is, 
universities express that they are not fully able to appropriate the economic benefits 
from the sale of their knowledge via the use of the patent system. 
Instead, when universities buy or in-license patents they find that they pay a high 
price (usually set by the seller) which allows the seller to cover its R&D costs (and 
which possibly is higher than the value of the invention).  
Table 8. Patent appropriability failures  
Assumption 
tested 
Choice options 
Buying or 
in-
licensing 
patents 
Selling or 
out-
licensing 
patents 
Cross-
licensing 
or pooling 
patents 
IPR confer 
(temporary) 
monopoly 
power 
Price is usually set by buyer 12.5% 6.1% 0.0% 
Price is usually set by seller 62.5% 1.3% 0.0% 
Price is usually jointly negotiated between 
buyer and seller 
25.0% 44.1% 100.0% 
Price is usually set by a third 
(independent) party 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Depends on the circumstances: no usual 
way in which price is set 
0.0% 15.1% 0.0% 
IPR render Price of IPR usually correctly reflects 37.5% 23.9% 50.0% 
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knowledge 
perfectly 
appropriable 
and allow to 
cover R&D 
costs 
economic value of invention 
Price of IPR is usually able to cover R&D 
costs of invention 
62.5% 27.6% 12.5% 
 
The market for copyright is also one where the price is negotiated between the parties 
rather than set by one of them. Having a monopoly on the knowledge exchanged, 
thanks to the ownership of copyright, does not ensure that the seller has the ability to 
set the price unilaterally. Rather, probably due to the fact that there is a limited 
number of potential buyers for copyrighted knowledge, buyers also have some market 
power, and the price is the outcome of a negotiation. This leads most universities to 
refute the statement that the price of copyright reflects the economic value of the 
invention and that it allows the inventor to cover R&D costs. It appears that the use of 
registered copyright does not guarantee full appropriability of the economic returns 
from the knowledge that is exchanged. 
Table 9. Copyright appropriability failures 
Assumption 
tested 
Choice options 
Buying or in-
licensing 
copyright 
Selling or out-
licensing 
copyright 
IPR confer 
(temporary) 
monopoly 
power 
Price is usually set by buyer 0.0% 10.1% 
Price is usually set by seller 33.3% 23.7% 
Price is usually jointly negotiated 
between buyer and seller 
58.3% 41.4% 
Price is usually set by a third 
(independent) party 
0.0% 0.0% 
Depends on the circumstances: no usual 
way in which price is set 
8.3% 24.7% 
IPR render 
knowledge 
perfectly 
appropriable 
and allow to 
cover R&D 
costs 
Price of IPR usually correctly reflects 
economic value of invention 
41.7% 17.1% 
Price of IPR is usually able to cover 
R&D costs of invention 
12.5% 17.4% 
 
4.3. Institutional failures 
We then investigate institutional failures in the marketplace. We ask whether 
enforcement mechanisms in the marketplace function properly; whether it is possible 
to rule out opportunistic behavior (either by means of effective contractual safeguards 
or thanks to the presence of trust among the parties); whether there are shared social 
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and behavioural norms which facilitate transactions by promoting shared 
expectations; and finally whether formal IPR regulations are adequately supporting 
IPR exchanges. Table 10 reports the shares of universities that agree that the 
statements reported in the column on the left identify important obstacles to 
exchanges in the patent or copyright marketplace. Shares are computed with respect 
to the number of universities that answered each question. 
Table 10. Institutional failures 
Assumption tested Specific obstacle investigated Patents Copyright 
 
Number of universities that answered 
the question 
14 11 
Presence of 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
Excessive cost of enforcing contract 21.4% 27.3% 
Problems, not related to cost, with 
enforcing contract 
14.3% 0.0% 
Possibility to rule out 
opportunistic 
behaviour by 
negotiating 
“complete” contracts 
or thanks to trust 
Difficulty in negotiating the terms, 
not related to price, of contract 
64.3% 18.2% 
Trust issues (opportunistic behaviour, 
free-riding, or similar) 
7.0% 9.1% 
Shared behavioural 
norms and 
expectations 
Different practices of firms 21.4% 9.1% 
Presence of adequate 
supporting 
regulations 
Regulations allow too exclusive 
rights 
0.0% 0.0% 
International IPR regulations do not 
fit needs of different local markets 
7.1% 18.2% 
 
The results suggest that the institutions of the marketplace are perceived as hampering 
IPR exchanges only by a minority of respondents. The exception, in the case of 
patents, is the difficulty in negotiating the (non-price) terms of the exchange contract, 
which is perceived as relevant by 64.3% of the universities that answered the 
question. This suggests that it is very difficult for universities to write contracts that 
guarantee terms of use that are perceived as fair by both parties.  
Interestingly, enforcement costs and other difficulties are not perceived as being very 
important by most respondents, and it seems that shared norms of behaviour prevail. 
Similar patterns emerge in the case of copyright, with the difference that only 18.2% 
of respondents indicate the difficulty in negotiating the non-price terms of the 
copyright contract as an important obstacle; however, the enforcement cost of 
copyright is considered a problem by 27.3%. 
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4.4. IPR governance forms 
We now turn to individual governance forms within each IPR marketplace (selling, 
buying, licensing, pooling, etc.). We investigate the extent to which the each type of 
“IPR market” and “institutional” failure (as highlighted in Tables 2 and 3) is specific 
to certain governance forms (outlined in Table 1). We do so by computing, for each 
statement investigated (highlighted as ‘Assumption tested’ in Table 11), the 
coefficient of variation of the “% of respondents agreeing with the statement” across 
all IP governance forms. Higher values of the coefficient of variation listed in Table 
11 indicate greater variability (or greater disagreement) in the importance of that type 
of “failure” across governance forms. 
Table 11. “IPR market” and “institutional” failures: variability across governance 
forms 
Type of 
“failure” 
Assumption tested Specific obstacle 
patent 
governance 
forms: 
coefficient of 
variation 
copyright 
governance 
forms: 
coefficient 
of variation 
IPR market 
failures 
Perfect information 
about 
characteristics and 
value of IPR 
Difficulty in finding the best IPR 0.8 n.a. 
Difficulty in assessing degree of 
novelty/originality of IPR 
0.7 1.17 
Lack of clarity of IPR document 0.0 n.a. 
Difficulty in assessing economic value of 
IPR 
0.6 0.14 
Market “clears” 
easily 
Difficulty in locating owners of IPR 1.1 1.62 
Difficulty in locating users of IPR 0.8 1.21 
Difficulty in negotiating price for IPR 0.6 0.38 
Institutional 
failures 
Presence of 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
Excessive cost of enforcing contract 1.6 0.29 
Problems, not related to cost, with 
enforcing contract 
1.6 0.00  
Possibility to rule 
out opportunistic 
behaviour by 
negotiating 
“complete” 
contracts or thanks 
to trust 
Difficulty in negotiating contract terms, not 
related to price 
0.6 2.00 
Trust issues (opportunistic behaviour, free-
riding, or similar) 
2.4 1.31 
Shared behavioural 
norms and 
expectations 
Different practices of firms 1.6 2.00 
Presence of 
adequate 
supporting 
regulations 
Regulations allow too exclusive rights 0.0 0.00 
International IPR regulations do not fit 
needs of different local markets 
1.6 0.87 
 
In the case of patents and “institutional failures”, there appears to be great variability 
across governance forms with respect to: cost of enforcing the contract (found 
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particularly when selling and out-licensing patents); problems with enforcing the 
contract, not related to cost (found particularly when selling and out-licensing 
patents); trust issues (found particularly when buying patents); different practices of 
firms (found particularly when selling and out-licensing patents) and dealing with 
international markets (found particularly when cross-licensing and pooling patents). 
“IPR market failures” seem to occur to a similar extent in all governance forms, 
denoted by a relatively small coefficient of variation.  
For copyright, in the case of “institutional failures”, there is great variability across 
governance forms with respect to: difficulty in negotiating the terms of the copyright 
contract not related to price (particularly found when out-licensing copyright); trust 
issues (particularly found when out-licensing copyright); different practices of firms 
(particularly found when selling copyright). In the case of “IPR market failures”, 
there is great variability across governance forms with respect to: difficulty in 
assessing the originality of copyright (particularly found when selling and out-
licensing); difficulty in locating the owners of copyright (particularly found when 
buying); difficulty in locating the users of copyright (particularly found when selling 
and out-licensing).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our investigation into the obstacles that universities encounter when exchanging 
formal IPR – patents and copyright – allows us to shed some light on the functioning 
and efficiency of IPR marketplaces. The main findings can be summarized as follows. 
5.1. Universities report a high degree of “market failures” when exchanging patents 
and copyright.  
Universities reject the assumption of perfect information about the value of IPR, 
which they find difficult to assess. Furthermore, because of the difficulty in agreeing 
on the value of the IPR, there are substantial difficulties in the negotiation of the 
price, so that the market does not clear very easily. In the case of patents, this is 
compounded by the difficulty in finding potential buyers for academic patents. While, 
in the case of patents, market failures are equally found across all IP governance 
forms, in the case of copyright certain problems are specific to governance forms (for 
instance, locating the users of copyright is a relatively important problem when out-
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licensing and selling, and locating the owners of copyright is a relatively important 
problem when buying, difficulty in assessing the originality of the copyright is a 
relatively large problem when out-licensing and selling). 
5.2. The price that emerges from IPR transactions does not allow the university to 
appropriate the full financial benefits: incentives to trade IPR resides in other 
strategies.  
The price is usually the outcome of a negotiation between buyer and seller, both of 
which have some bargaining power. Consequently, the IPR seller or licensor is unable 
to extract a monopoly price from the transaction of the IPR. Consistently with this 
result, universities also find that the price that emerges from the negotiation does not 
make it possible to cover the R&D costs of the invention and does not reflect its 
perceived financial value. Thus, the incentives to exchange IPRs in the market place 
must be partly non-financial (such as knowledge transfer, interactive learning 
processes, strategic positioning, etc). In the case of patents, universities consider these 
problems to be particularly important when they are on the “supply” side of a 
transaction, that is when they sell, out-license, cross-license or pool university patents. 
In the case of copyright, these problems are considered quite important across all 
governance forms. 
5.3. Universities consider “institutional failures” to be relatively less problematic.  
In the case of patents, most problems having to do with the institutions that support 
the marketplace are considered important by only a minority of respondents. The only 
exception is the problem of negotiating the non-price terms of the patent, whose 
importance is considered quite high across most governance forms: this suggests that 
it is difficult for universities to agree on terms of use that are perceived as fair by both 
parties. Other problems are specific to certain IP governance forms, such as the cost 
and other difficulties of enforcing the patent contract, trust issues, different norms of 
behavior, and problems with international regulations.  
In the case of copyright, most types of institutional failures are considered important 
by relatively low shares of respondents. A notable exception is the cost of 
enforcement of copyright, which is considered quite high relative to the value of the 
intellectual property being exchanged (given that infringements are difficult and 
costly to detect and to litigate, and even when detected the compensation for such 
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infringements is generally low). Other problems, which are specific to certain IP 
governance forms, include the difficulty in negotiating the non-price terms of the 
contract, trust issues and different behavioural norms. 
5.4 Policy implications 
The findings have several implications for policymakers interested in addressing 
some of the issues hampering IPR marketplaces.  
On the one hand, some of the obstacles reported in the flow of academic knowledge 
into use could be mitigated by interventions aimed at increasing transparency in the 
marketplace by enhancing the circulation of information about the characteristics of 
IPR. Examples include: better public reporting of IP transactions and their economic 
impact; greater disclosure of the true ownership status of patents and licenses and 
provision of more information in public patent databases (e.g. ownership and 
assignment, licensing and litigation status, whether a patent is available for licensing 
or not); greater use of standardized contracts (see also Cockburn, 2007, for a 
discussion of possible interventions to increase the transparency of IPR 
marketplaces). In order to improve market clearing processes, some interventions 
could be aimed at facilitating the identification of potential partners in IPR 
transactions and at improving negotiations between the parties: for example, provision 
of more information about university patents and copyright that are available for sale 
or licensing (such information can e.g. be supplied by the researchers), and greater 
use of intermediaries that can help both parties to assess the value of the IPR and 
negotiate contracts. 
On the other hand, it appears that some problems are due to the nature of academic 
knowledge and cannot be solved by privatizing it via patents or copyright. It is well 
known that, as university knowledge often tends to be quite basic in nature, it is likely 
to involve substantial uncertainty in terms of its scope of application (which often 
leads to firms’ inability to value such knowledge and to fully appropriate its economic 
returns) and time to market (which would require firms to invest substantially in 
further development activities): these features of academic knowledge make IPR 
negotiations particularly difficult and lead to prices which do not correctly reflect the 
value of the underlying knowledge. Although, in the case of universities, IPR prices 
are not directly used to guide the allocation of resources to invention, if price signals 
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are wrong this could still have important consequences. The prospective returns 
obtained from patent sales and royalties may in theory influence the allocation of 
individual effort on the part of scientists, leading to insufficient or excessive scientific 
effort in certain areas. Whether the incentives of academics are stimulated by patent 
grants is controversial in practice. However, prices in the patent marketplace may 
have an indirect effect on the allocation of funds to university research: in fact, 
indicators of “economic impact” (including revenues from patenting activity) have 
gained increasing weight in the assessment of the performance of academic 
departments and research centres, which in turn affects their likelihood to obtain 
public research funds.  
Furthermore, if universities are unable to fully appropriate the financial value of the 
knowledge they produce by turning it into a private good, this implies that the private 
firms that purchase or license this good are appropriating a relatively large share of 
the financial benefit from academic knowledge. That is, public funds are used to 
partly subsidize the production of private goods that are enjoyed by a limited number 
of firms rather than collectively. This could introduce distortion in the market. These 
problems strengthen the argument that allowing academic knowledge, especially 
when more general and widely applicable, to be openly disseminated may be less 
distortive and more socially beneficial. 
Further research into universities’ participation in, and use of, markets for technology 
would be helpful in order to understand whether the problems identified are specific 
to certain types of academic research disciplines or to certain types of institutions. 
Research should in particular be carried out with larger samples and with focus on 
different units of analysis (not just technology transfer offices but also individual 
academics). Alternatively, looking at the demand side of the flow of academic 
knowledge, and in particular investigate firms’ specific difficulties when engaging in 
IPR market transactions with universities, would also enrich our understanding of 
these processes. 
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